OTHER CAMPAIGNS

4 German South East Africa (now Tanzania)

by Bob Butcher

At the outbreak of war the local British forces in the region were too few to contemplate invading German East Africa. India was therefore asked for help and responded by sending a two brigade expeditionary force. One brigade contained 2nd Loyal North Lancashire and three Indian battalions, the other had been hastily assembled and consisted of Indian battalions of somewhat dubious fighting value. With this force, the India Office expected its commander to seize the port of Tanga and then the whole of the German colony -- all 384,000 square miles of it.The landing at Tanga in November 1914 was a shambles and the 7000 strong force with naval support was repulsed by a much smaller enemy force and had to re-embark. The War Office then took control and on its orders there were only minor raids and engagements during the rest of 1914 and the whole of 1915, chiefly on the Uganda side. Following re-organisation and the arrival of substantial South African forces in British East Africa (now Kenya), an offensive began in the Spring of 1916 in the Kilimanjaro area and by September a large part of the German colony and all its 620 mile coast line had been  gained. Enveloping tactics were used but the enemy was invariably able to slip away. Thus, whilst considerable territorial gains were made at moderate cost, the enemy lived to fight another day. The British forces consisted three weak divisions of South Africans, Rhodesians, Indians, Africans and two British Army battalions. They were joined by a Nigerian Brigade, a battalion of the Gold Coast Regiment and 2nd West India Regiment.

During this time a force consisting mostly of whites from the Rhodesia’s and Nyasaland had advanced in the south from Nyasaland. It was better organised than the main body with which it eventually linked up. At the same time the Belgians and South Africans advanced from the Congo and Uganda (Lake Victoria).

Battle losses in the main body had not been heavy but tropical diseases, the arduous nature of the campaign, the lack of adequate medical services and near starvation rations resulted in very heavy non-battle casualties. The condition of the remaining white and Indian troops was so poor that most had to be withdrawn from the theatre                   for extensive recuperation. These were largely replaced by the expanded King's African Rifles (KAR), it being thought that as it was locally raised, its members had a certain immunity to malaria and were also better bush fighters.

There was now a change of command, the outgoing C in C stating that the campaign was now virtually over-- but the enemy had not been brought to battle, let alone defeated. In fact operations that were renewed early in 1917 had not cleared the enemy from German East Africa until near the end of that year and even then without destroying him. He then crossed into Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). That colony was then cleared of the enemy who re-crossed into German East Africa and subsequently North Rhodesia. It was not until 25 November 1918 that the German commander surrendered. 

The total British battle casualties (killed in action, died of wounds, missing) for the troops and carriers were 14,692. The total non-battle casualties (dead due to accident or disease and sickness) for troops and carriers was 578,428 plus an unknown number of sickness for 1914--15. The casualties for the Gold Coast Battalion which fought from August 1916 to August 1918 are probably typical of African battalions: 215 killed in action, 725 wounded, 13 missing, 276 dead of disease, 567 invalided. Non-battle casualties for white units were much higher.

The East Africa campaign had been a most difficult one. It was a campaign of manoeuvre and hard marching over mountains, through bush and across rivers, lakes and swamps. Periods of drought and dust were followed by seasons of torrential rains and mud. At all times the fierce heat and luxuriant vegetation were productive of parasitic life which caused many diseases.

The nature of the territory made supply most difficult as the few roads were often not passable for the small number of motor vehicles available or even for horse, mule, donkey or oxen drawn carts and the tsetse fly meant that the animals would last for only a year at the most. Much reliance had therefore to be placed on a large force of native carriers, nearly 150,000 at one time, and they suffered a very high wastage rate due to sickness and desertion. It must be said, however, that poor planning for the main body added to the natural difficulties of supplying the fighting troops.

There were some unusual incidents during the campaign. The German commerce raider Konisberg sank HMS Pegasus while it was undergoing engine repairs in Zanzibar. Later she was forced to seek refuge in the River Rufiji Delta where she was trapped and later shelled by British ships causing her captain to scuttle her after removing all her guns, ammunition and stores. Pegasus also salvaged her guns which, like those of Konisberg, were later used in support of the land forces.

The landing force at Tanga were attacked by a swarm of bees to add to their worries. It is recorded that the 2nd West India Regiment was used on the L of C and that the only shot they fired in anger was at a female rhinoceros and its calf which charged at some troops. On one occasion British and German columns passed close to each other without knowing it but finished up with each other's baggage columns.

Note: In this and earlier articles, I have used the term 'colony' when 'protectorate' might have been more accurate. The difference would seem to be purely academic.

THE STATISTICS OF BIRMINGHAM'S WAR

3. 'Help'

by Alan Tucker

v The Lady Mayoress' depot dispatched 273,533 clothing parcels to the Front.

v During the war 130,162 food parcels were sent to the Front.

v The Lady Mayoress' depot had a total income of £111,754.

v On the way to the north 2372 trains were dealt with at the 'Rest Station' at Snow Hill.

SPEAKING FRANKLY

by John Lethbridge

I was in Birmingham Library reading the BIRMINGHAM POST for 5 September 1933 looking for a true crime story when I found the following review.

AN OLD CONTEMPTIBLE'S WAR BOOK

Old Soldiers Never Die by Frank Richards (Faber 7s. 6d)

The author of this book draws a type which should go down to history for the like of it we may not see again. No other war book writer had shown such truth and unconscious ease the mentality, which almost defies analysis, of the best of the old Regulars. Private Richards had served eight years with the Colours, seven of them in India and Burma, and had been five years on Reserve when the Great War came. The Mons Retreat, Loos, Givenchy, the Somme, Arras, Third Ypres and the fighting in 1918 were his experiences. He writes with some disregard of grammatical conventions and often with quaint phrases which the publishers do well to retain: he is an intelligent, thinking man - only an alert mind, aided of course, by fortune, could have brought him through such a war career.

Throughout all there is a quality of convincing honesty. In the 1914 retreat for instance he saw little of the Germans beyond a few Uhlans and for the rest it was a case of march and march, day and night--until men saw things (possibly the 'Mons Angels' for his comrades saw buildings that did not exist, on the dark roadsides), in their fatigue. At other periods of the war he shows that discomfort and the search for food can be as all important to the soldier as the hectic moments of battle. Richards lasted long enough to become an institution in the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, a battalion of whom in 1914 seventy percent were Birmingham men. He served under Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon neither of whom saw much active service, but both of whom left an excellent impression on their men; these after all were the best judges of an infantry officer, since their main standard was that of courage.

There is here much of the light, ironic humour and the humorous acceptance of sardonic fate typical of the best British soldier. Horrors are accepted as a natural part of war and there is none of the pathological analysis of some war books. Richards has known illness and the disillusion of many soldiers who served well. His book is worth anyone's reading but soldiers will recognise the authentic voice of the 'foot slogger'.

They say you learn something new every day. According to this review neither Robert Graves not Siegfried Sassoon, who won the Military Cross, saw 'much active service'! I wonder who wrote this review and if he had ever been near the front line?

 

 

 

The Bulletin of the Birmingham Branch of the WFA

Compiled by Bob Butcher

April 2007