May 2006

 

AN ALLIED MATA HARI?

In October 1914, Louise de Bettignies found herself in occupied Lille and became an agent of both the British and French. She was known as Alice Dubois to the British and Pauline to the French. As Lille was opposite the British sector, most of her activities were for the British and consisted largely of carrying messages written in lemon juice.

Another of her activities was to sit in a cafe listening to German soldiers there who chatted away without realising that she spoke perfect German. Soon she expanded her work by assisting Allied soldiers caught behind the lines to escape to neutral Holland. Sadly this was her undoing and on 28 October 1915 she was arrested at Tournai and brought before a military tribunal in Brussels which, the following March, sentenced her to death. However, perhaps mindful of the international reaction to the execution of Nurse Edit Cavell, the sentence was commuted to imprisonment.

She was held in Sieberg prison where she was later confined to her cell for inciting other prisoners not to work for the Germans. Her health deteriorated and she was transferred to a hospital in Cologne where she died in September 1918. One account states that she succumbed to pneumonia, but another says that she survived thanks to the care of fellow prisoners as the Germans denied her medical treatment but later died of a tumour on her breast. The Germans are alleged to have refused to send her to a specialist hospital and, despite appeals from, among others, the Pope and the King of Spain to send her to a neutral country. it is said that she refused treatment by the prison doctor.

Louise de Bettignies was subsequently decorated by the French with the Legion of Honour and the Croix de Guerre. The British awarded her the Order of the British Empire (OBE) and the Military Cross (MC).

 

BRITISH ATTACK TACTICS

It seems to me that these evolved through several phases although the transition was never clear cut and elements were present throughout each.

FIRE AND MOVEMENT. The Regulars of the original divisions were well trained in this. The infantry advanced in small open groups until within range of the enemy rifle fire. One group would then give covering fire while another advanced in small rushes using whatever cover the ground offered. The roles were then alternated until a line was reached from which the final attack could be made. The line would be reinforced and when fire superiority was gained, a bayonet charge made in line with intervals between men to reduce casualties. For a similar reason, bunching of men was to be avoided at all times.

Machine guns would support the attack, usually from the flanks. The artillery would also give support either from the flanks or with overhead fire. The guns would usually be placed close to the infantry, often in positions offering little if any cover and under the voice control of the officer directing the fire. A proportion of HE shells was provided for the 4.5 inch howitzers but otherwise the field artillery had only shrapnel.

In fact the BEF had little opportunity to use these tactics during the open warfare period at the beginning of the war as it was mostly on the defensive.

THE ARTILLERY CONQUERS AND THE INFANTRY OCCUPIES. The initial success at Neauve Chapelle (March 1915) led the Allied commanders to believe that if they bombarded the enemy line heavily enough, they could achieve a breakthrough and the infantry merely had to occupy the position. By this time the artillery was sited farther back and its fire directed by forward observation officers or from the air. Heavy and prolonged bombardments were intended to cut the enemy wire and kill the enemy. They ended with a thirty minute intensification and then the infantry advanced in successive waves or lines of, say, two yards between men and fifty between waves. (Sometimes 'wave' was intended to mean a number of 'lines'.) The advance was to be made at a moderate pace to enable control to be kept and to ensure that all the attackers reached the enemy trenches at the same time.

It was accepted that the more waves used, the more likely was success. Thus the rule of thumb: ' A single line has usually failed; two lines have usually failed; three lines have generally succeeded but sometimes failed; four or more lines have generally succeeded.'

The preliminary bombardment churned up no man's land making movement over it difficult and, moreover, warned the enemy that an attack was imminent. The rigidity of the system meant that if an advancing line was held in one spot, the whole line tended to stop. It also meant that repeated attacks were made where previous ones had failed, in violation of the maxim 'Reinforce success, not failure.' The C in C wanted a breakthrough and set distant and unrealistic objectives although the commander of the Fourth Army favoured seizing nearer objectives and consolidating them until the artillery was in position to support another set piece battle. This was known as 'bite and hold' or 'step by step'.

The opening stages of the Somme revealed all too clearly the defects of the tactics employed and by the end of the year (1916) the lessons were being learnt. Thus at Vimy (April 1917) the artillery's role was to overpower the enemy's, kill or shake his infantry and destroy his wire and fortifications. The new 108 fuse was better for wire cutting and the final period of intensive fire was reduced to ten minutes to give the defenders less time to get out of their dug outs before the infantry were upon them. As the attackers advanced a creeping barrage rolled forward ahead of them to keep the enemy's heads down. One feature was the offensive use of machine guns to form a barrage by overhead fire.

Typically two companies of a battalion moved in front and two in support. Each front company was in two waves, each wave consisted of two platoons and moving in two lines fifteen yards apart. One platoon from the support company followed in two lines twenty-five yards apart behind the first wave to mop up the first enemy trench. The second wave followed twenty-five yards behind the moppers -up. Another platoon from the support company followed to mop up the second and third enemy trenches. One hundred yards behind the moppers-up, the remainder of the support company followed in artillery (ie open) formation.

Great importance was attached to crossing no man's land as quickly as possible and if one unit was held up, its neighbours had to throw out a defensive flank and continue the advance. Each platoon was assigned a specific objective, the capture of which was carefully rehearsed. The advance was to be bounds, the intermediate objectives being referred to by colours. A breakthrough was not intended and realistic objectives were set.

To be continued.

BOOK OF THE MONTH: List 199 WITH A MACHINE GUN TO CAMBRAI by George Coppard. The author was an early Kitchener recruit who enlisted in the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment. He became a machine gunner and transferred to the Machine Gun Corps when that was formed. This is a modest account of his experiences culminating, as the title suggests, with the big tank battle. We see the MGC mentioned often enough but seldom do we get to know what it was like from the inside -- this is your chance to make good that deficiency. Incidentally, I heard him talk at a London meeting and, although he was of course then getting in years, he was still very alert: Bob

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Bulletin of the Birmingham Branch of the WFA

Compiled by Bob Butcher